Application of systems and control theory‐based hazard analysis to radiation oncology. Issue 3 (26th February 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pawlicki, Todd; Samost, Aubrey; Brown, Derek W.; Manger, Ryan P.; Kim, Gwe‐Ya; Leveson, Nancy G.
• Is Part Of: Medical physics. Volume 43:Issue 3(2016)
• Page Start: 1514
• Page End: 1530
• Publication Date: 2016-02-26
• Subjects: cancer -- computerised tomography -- control theory -- radiation therapy -- surgery -- system theory; Stereotactic radiosurgery -- Computed tomography; Computerised tomographs -- Surgical instruments, devices or methods, e.g. tourniquets -- Radiation therapy -- Biological material, e.g. blood, urine; Haemocytometers; STPA -- risk -- hazard -- safety -- radiosurgery; Process monitoring and control -- Cancer -- Radiation treatment -- Cone beam computed tomography -- Failure analysis -- Medical physicists -- Radiosurgery -- Computer software -- Radiation monitoring; Medical physics -- Periodicals; Medical physics; Geneeskunde; Natuurkunde; Toepassingen; Biophysics; Periodicals; Periodicals; Electronic journals; 610.153
• DOI: 10.1118/1.4942384
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0094-2405

Abstract

Abstract : Purpose: Both humans and software are notoriously challenging to account for in traditional hazard analysis models. The purpose of this work is to investigate and demonstrate the application of a new, extended accident causality model, called systems theoretic accident model and processes (STAMP), to radiation oncology. Specifically, a hazard analysis technique based on STAMP, system‐theoretic process analysis (STPA), is used to perform a hazard analysis. Methods: The STPA procedure starts with the definition of high‐level accidents for radiation oncology at the medical center and the hazards leading to those accidents. From there, the hierarchical safety control structure of the radiation oncology clinic is modeled, i.e., the controls that are used to prevent accidents and provide effective treatment. Using STPA, unsafe control actions (behaviors) are identified that can lead to the hazards as well as causal scenarios that can lead to the identified unsafe control. This information can be used to eliminate or mitigate potential hazards. The STPA procedure is demonstrated on a new online adaptive cranial radiosurgery procedure that omits the CT simulation step and uses CBCT for localization, planning, and surface imaging system during treatment. Results: The STPA procedure generated a comprehensive set of causal scenarios that are traced back to system hazards and accidents. Ten control loops were created for the new SRS procedure, which covered the areas of hospital and department management, treatment design and delivery, and vendor service. Eighty three unsafe control actions were identified as well as 472 causal scenarios that could lead to those unsafe control actions. Conclusions: STPA provides a method for understanding the role of management decisions and hospital operations on system safety and generating process design requirements to prevent hazards and accidents. The interaction of people, hardware, and software is highlighted. The method of STPA produces results that can be used to improve safety and prevent accidents and warrants further investigation.