Possible Persons and the Problems of Posterity. (1st May 1996)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Grey, William
• Is Part Of: Environmental values. Volume 5:Number 2(1996:Summer)
• Page Start: 161
• Page End: 179
• Publication Date: 1996-05-01
• Subjects: future persons -- duty to posterity -- Parfit; Environmental ethics -- Periodicals; Environmental policy -- Periodicals; 179.105
• DOI: 10.3197/096327196776679366
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0963-2719

Abstract

Abstract : The moral status of future persons is problematic. It is often claimed that we should take the interests of the indefinite unborn very seriously, because they have a right to a decent life. It is also claimed (often by the same people) that we should allow unrestricted access to abortion, because the indefinite unborn have no rights. In this paper I argue that these intuitions are not in fact inconsistent. The aim is to provide an account of trans-temporal concern which resolves the prima facie inconsistency between commonly held intuitions about our obligations to future persons. I argue that our intuitions can be reconciled provided that we explicate obligations to the future in terms of impersonal principles subject to retroactive person-affecting constraints.