Aristotle on the voluntariness of self-control and the lack of self-control (EE II 8, 1224a7-1225a2). Issue 1 (2nd January 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Di Basilio, Giulio
• Is Part Of: British journal for the history of philosophy. Volume 29:Issue 1(2021)
• Page Start: 4
• Page End: 23
• Publication Date: 2021-01-02
• Subjects: Aristotle -- Eudemian Ethics -- voluntariness -- force -- nature; Philosophy -- History -- Periodicals; 109
• DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2020.1748567
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0960-8788

Abstract

ABSTRACT: I argue that in Eudemian Ethics II 8 Aristotle provides us with a general definition of force ( bia ) applicable to all natural phenomena. This definition points us to an important, though rarely noticed, requirement for voluntary action; namely that the impulse acted upon be natural to its possessor. The definition of force is further put to use in the chapter to solve puzzles concerning self-control and the lack of it. In addition to laying bare his solution to these puzzles, I emphasize Aristotle's keen interest in explaining the mistake of his opponents; namely those who deny that self-control and its lack are voluntary. Most importantly, some of Aristotle's replies work with premisses accepted by, and granted to, his interlocutors to point out their mistakes.