Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model. (1st January 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wang, Mingyue; Li, Yingming; Cheng, Zhixuan; Zhong, Chao; Ma, Wenjing
• Is Part Of: Journal of cleaner production. Volume 278(2021)
• Publication Date: 2021-01-01
• Subjects: Government market regulation -- Enterprise GTI -- Evolutionary game theory -- System dynamics; Factory and trade waste -- Management -- Periodicals; Manufactures -- Environmental aspects -- Periodicals; Déchets industriels -- Gestion -- Périodiques; Usines -- Aspect de l'environnement -- Périodiques; 628.5
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123944
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0959-6526

Abstract

Abstract: Green technological innovation (GTI) is an important driving force to achieve high-quality development. In terms of system engineering, GTI is a process of multi-agent participation and dynamic evolution. To determine the evolution of a GTI system, an evolutionary game model composed of local governments, enterprises, and consumers is constructed. The evolutionary process and the influence of participants' strategy choices on the system equilibrium are then analyzed, and an experimental simulation is carried out using the system dynamics method. The findings are as follows. (1) Of all the possible equilibrium strategies of the GTI evolution game system, only three are stable: market regulation by local government, non-GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing traditional products; market regulation by local government, GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing traditional products; and market deregulation, GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing green products. (2) The brand benefits of enterprises' GTI and the economic income from consumers' green product consumption are the main factors that influence the evolution of the game system to different stable equilibrium strategies. (3) Under the equilibrium state (1, 1, 1), the impact of the GTI system is more significant if enterprises are encouraged to adopt a GTI strategy and consumers are encouraged to choose a green product strategy. (4) Subsidy coefficient, market regulation intensity, and brand benefits of GTI of enterprise are the main factors influencing enterprises to adopt a GTI strategy, and each factor has a significant difference on the direction and marginal influence of the main players' strategy choice. These findings provide a reference for further refinements to green development theory and for the construction of a market-oriented GTI system. Graphical abstract: Image 1 Highlights: A comprehensive evolutionary game model to analyze the green technological innovation (GTI) system is constructed. Give out the evolutionary process of the influence of the players and the system under different scenarios. Of all possible equilibrium states of the GTI game system, there are only three stable equilibrium strategies. Brand benefits of GTI and economic income of green consumption are the main influence factors for system equilibrium. The influence factors have great differences on the different players, including the direction and volume of influence.