The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance: A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms. (September 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Dinh, Trung Quang; Calabrò, Andrea; Campopiano, Giovanna; Basco, Rodrigo
• Other Names: Bertoni Fabio guest-editor.; Bonini Stefano guest-editor.; Capizzi Vincenzo guest-editor.; Colombo Massimo G. guest-editor.; Manigart Sophie guest-editor.
• Is Part Of: Entrepreneurship theory and practice. Volume 46:Number 5(2022)
• Page Start: 1284
• Page End: 1316
• Publication Date: 2022-09
• Subjects: family firm -- political connection -- transition economy -- family CEO -- board of directors -- firm performance -- former SOEs -- Vietnam; Small business -- Periodicals; New business enterprises -- Periodicals; Entrepreneurship -- Periodicals; 658.421
• DOI: 10.1177/1042258720985477
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1042-2587

Abstract

Integrating new institutional economics and resource dependence theory, this study investigates whether in transition economies, characterized by shifting from centrally commanded to more market-oriented economies, there are performance differences among family firms (FFs), nonfamily firms (non-FFs), and former state-owned enterprises (former SOEs), and whether political connections affect these differences. Our findings suggest that FFs outperform non-FFs and former SOEs, unless non-FFs have politically connected CEOs. The performance gap in favor of FFs increases at high levels of board political connection intensity. Among FFs, the top-performing ones either promote nonfamily leadership or combine family leadership with politically connected boards of directors.