A defense of objectivism about evidential support. Issue 5 (December 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hedden, Brian
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 45:Issue 5/6(2015)
• Page Start: 716
• Page End: 743
• Publication Date: 2015-12
• Subjects: Diachronic norms -- epistemology -- rationality -- evidence -- explanation; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2015.1123038
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

Abstract : Objectivism about evidential support is the thesis that facts about the degree to which a body of evidence supports a hypothesis are objective rather than depending on subjective factors like one's own language or epistemic values. Objectivism about evidential support is key to defending a synchronic, time-slice-centric conception of epistemic rationality, on which what you ought to believe at a time depends only on what evidence you have at that time, and not on how you were at previous times. Here, I defend a version of objectivism about evidential support on which facts about evidential support are grounded in facts about explanatoriness.