Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering. (6th March 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Konishi, Hideo; Pan, Chen‐Yu
• Is Part Of: Journal of public economic theory. Volume 22:Number 5(2020)
• Page Start: 1183
• Page End: 1212
• Publication Date: 2020-03-06
• Subjects: Economic policy -- Periodicals; Finance, Public -- Periodicals; 338.9005
• DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12433
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1097-3923

Abstract

Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. Party leaders have both office‐ and policy‐motivations. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one‐sidedly biased district profile, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district profile. In contrast, with limited freedom in gerrymandering, both partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering tend to prescribe the same policy.