IV—Wittgenstein, Anscombe and the Need for Metaphysical Thinking. Issue 2 (30th June 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wiseman, Rachael
• Is Part Of: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy. Volume 122:Issue 2(2022)
• Page Start: 71
• Page End: 95
• Publication Date: 2022-06-30
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoac004
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0066-7374

Abstract

Abstract: Metaphysicians are in the business of making and defending modal claims—claims about how things must, or could or could not be. Wittgenstein's opposition to necessity claims, along with his various negative remarks about 'metaphysical' uses of language, makes it seem almost a truism that Wittgenstein was opposed to metaphysics. In this paper I want to make a case for rejecting that apparent truism. My thesis is that it is illuminating to characterize what Wittgenstein and Anscombe are doing in their philosophical writing as metaphysics without manufactured necessities . Doing so helps to articulate a sharper, more interesting, critique of contemporary metaphysical practices than therapeutic or linguistic framings of Wittgenstein's method make possible. It also allows us to place Anscombe in the context of a tradition of British metaphysics that emerged in the 1940s in an attempt to reverse the devastating impact on ethics of the new 'analytical' philosophy.