Epistemic Agency Under Oppression. (3rd May 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pohlhaus, Gaile
• Is Part Of: Philosophical papers. Volume 49:Number 2(2020)
• Page Start: 233
• Page End: 251
• Publication Date: 2020-05-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, African -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2020.1780149
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0556-8641

Abstract

Abstract: The literature on epistemic injustice has been helpful for highlighting some of the epistemic harms that have long troubled those working in area studies that concern oppressed populations. Nonetheless, a good deal of this literature is oriented toward those in a position to perpetrate injustices, rather than those who historically have been harmed by them. This orientation, I argue, is ill-suited to the work of epistemic decolonization. In this essay, I call and hold attention to the epistemic interests of those who are epistemically marginalized on account of relations of dominance and oppression. To do so, I draw on Kristie Dotson's work, which uses a systems approach focused on epistemic agency. I develop Dotson's insights further to argue that epistemic inclusions may be just as pernicious as epistemic exclusions Specifically, I highlight some of the ways in which epistemic agents can be included in epistemic systems in a manner that is epistemically exploitative—extracting epistemic labor coercively or in ways that are distinctly non-reciprocal. I then turn to María Lugones' distinction between horizontal and vertical practices to discuss avenues of resisting both exclusions and inclusions that thwart the epistemic agency of marginalized knowers.