Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science. (November 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ivanova, Milena
• Is Part Of: Studies in history and philosophy of modern physics. Volume 52:Part B(2015)
• Page Start: 114
• Page End: 122
• Publication Date: 2015-11
• Subjects: Conventionalism -- Henri Poincaré -- Neo-Kantianism -- Structural realism -- Synthetic a priori; Physics -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Physics -- History -- Periodicals; 530.01
• DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.03.003
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1355-2198

Abstract

Abstract: Poincaré is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincaré׳s epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincaré׳s conventionalism and its position in Poincaré׳s hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincaré scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of science and defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincaré defends a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which precludes epistemic access to mind-independent structures.