Bad-faith cooperation. Issue 4 (3rd July 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Spaniel, William; Poznansky, Michael
• Is Part Of: International interactions. Volume 46:Issue 4(2020)
• Page Start: 579
• Page End: 605
• Publication Date: 2020-07-03
• Subjects: Conflict -- cooperation -- uncertainty -- power transitions -- institutional design -- cold war; International relations -- Research -- Periodicals; 327
• DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1751152
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0305-0629

Abstract

ABSTRACT: In many political contexts, antagonistic actors face a tradeoff. Broadly, they profit from noncooperative actions. But taking those actions signals unfriendly preferences to their targets, who may then take proactive countermeasures to mitigate the damage of later defections. We develop a model to investigate how actors can manipulate the signaling incentives. We show that the target best avoids initial defections when the cost and effectiveness of countermeasures fall in a middle region. Although antagonists find misrepresentation profitable, the initial cooperation that uncertainty induces gives impatient targets a greater overall payoff than with complete information. As a result, impatient targets may want to pre-commit to less attractive countermeasures to enjoy the benefits of initial cooperation. We illustrate the mechanism with a case study of the Soviet and American policy toward Central-Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War.