Animals, Relations, and the Laissez-Faire Intuition. (1st August 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hedberg, Trevor
• Is Part Of: Environmental values. Volume 25:Number 4(2016:Aug.)
• Page Start: 427
• Page End: 442
• Publication Date: 2016-08-01
• Subjects: Animals -- animal ethics -- laissez-faire intuition -- duties of assistance; Environmental ethics -- Periodicals; Environmental policy -- Periodicals; 179.105
• DOI: 10.3197/096327116X14661540759197
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0963-2719

Abstract

Abstract : In Animal Ethics in Context, Clare Palmer tries to harmonise two competing approaches to animal ethics. One focuses on the morally relevant capacities that animals possess. The other is the Laissez-Faire Intuition (LFI): the claim that we have duties to assist domesticated animals but should (at least generally) leave wild animals alone. In this paper, I critique the arguments that Palmer offers in favour of the No-Contact LFI - the view that we have ( prima facie ) duties not to harm wild animals but no duties to assist them. I argue that Palmer's endorsement of the No-Contact LFI is unwarranted. Her arguments actually provide strong reasons to endorse what I call the Gradient View - a position that posits weak presumptive duties to assist wild animals that become stronger as our relations with the animals grow stronger.