A defence of experimental philosophy in aesthetics. Issue 8 (13th September 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Torregrossa, Clotilde
• Is Part Of: Inquiry. Volume 63:Issue 8(2020)
• Page Start: 885
• Page End: 907
• Publication Date: 2020-09-13
• Subjects: Aesthetics -- experimental philosophy -- metaphilosophy -- intuitions; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social Sciences -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; Philosophie -- Périodiques; Sciences sociales -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1385527
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0020-174X

Abstract

Abstract: Although experimental philosophy is now over a decade old, it has only recently been introduced to the domain of philosophical aesthetics. So why is there already a need to defend it? Because, as I argue in this paper, we can anticipate the three main types of objection generally addressed to experimental philosophy and show that none of them concern experimental philosophers in aesthetics. I begin with some general considerations about experimental philosophy and its, sometimes conflicting, characteristics. This framework is designed to help me situate the experimental practice in aesthetics within the general movement. I then present the objections and respond to them in turn. Their failure should convince aestheticians to embrace the practice early on and opponents of experimental philosophy to revise their usual objections before addressing them to experimental philosophers in aesthetics.