The method(s) of cases. (2nd January 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Maynes, Jeffrey
• Is Part Of: Philosophical psychology. Volume 34:Number 1(2021)
• Page Start: 102
• Page End: 124
• Publication Date: 2021-01-02
• Subjects: Experimental philosophy -- philosophical methodology -- philosophy of mind -- thought experiments; Psychology -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Methodology -- Periodicals; 150.1
• DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2020.1845309
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0951-5089

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to philosophical cases play in philosophical argumentation. The method of appealing to such cases has been dubbed the "method of cases, " and, in recent work, Edouard Machery has both defended its prevalence and uniformity in philosophical practice, and criticized its epistemic value. In this paper, I argue that there is no single method of cases, but rather a set of methods of cases. To defend this claim, I distinguish and articulate these different methods and argue that they better explain several paradigmatic appeals to cases. This result not only challenges the homogeneity of the method of cases; it also stocks our methodological toolbox with additional interpretive tools which help us to not only better understand philosophical arguments, but to better understand the significance of experimental work.