Exposure-based reputation mechanism promotes the evolution of cooperation. (July 2022)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Exposure-based reputation mechanism promotes the evolution of cooperation. (July 2022)
- Main Title:
- Exposure-based reputation mechanism promotes the evolution of cooperation
- Authors:
- Zhu, Wenqiang
Pan, Qiuhui
He, Mingfeng - Abstract:
- Abstract: Exposure behavior can affect the reputation of both the exposer and the exposed. In this paper, we consider the effect of exposure-based reputation on the evolution of cooperation. There are three strategies in the population, including exposure cooperation, ordinary cooperation and defection. By undertaking an exposure cost, the exposer will praise the cooperator to increase his reputation and condemn the defector to decrease his reputation, while the reputation of the exposer will also change. Results show that five states emerge under different combinations of parameters, namely, all defection, all exposure cooperation, coexistence of exposure cooperation and ordinary cooperation, coexistence of exposure cooperation and defection, and coexistence of all three strategies. When the population pays moderate attention to payoff, there is a phased dominant phenomenon in three strategies regarding the temptation to defect. In addition, exposure cooperation has the opportunity to exist when the temptation to defect or the exposure cost is high. Thus, the fact that even in a harsh environment there will still be cooperators who make exposure, which provides a new perspective for understanding the emergence of cooperation. Highlights: Propose an evolutionary game model with exposure-based reputation mechanism We only focus on the changes in reputation due to exposure. Exposure cooperation has the opportunity to exist when the temptation to defect or the exposure cost isAbstract: Exposure behavior can affect the reputation of both the exposer and the exposed. In this paper, we consider the effect of exposure-based reputation on the evolution of cooperation. There are three strategies in the population, including exposure cooperation, ordinary cooperation and defection. By undertaking an exposure cost, the exposer will praise the cooperator to increase his reputation and condemn the defector to decrease his reputation, while the reputation of the exposer will also change. Results show that five states emerge under different combinations of parameters, namely, all defection, all exposure cooperation, coexistence of exposure cooperation and ordinary cooperation, coexistence of exposure cooperation and defection, and coexistence of all three strategies. When the population pays moderate attention to payoff, there is a phased dominant phenomenon in three strategies regarding the temptation to defect. In addition, exposure cooperation has the opportunity to exist when the temptation to defect or the exposure cost is high. Thus, the fact that even in a harsh environment there will still be cooperators who make exposure, which provides a new perspective for understanding the emergence of cooperation. Highlights: Propose an evolutionary game model with exposure-based reputation mechanism We only focus on the changes in reputation due to exposure. Exposure cooperation has the opportunity to exist when the temptation to defect or the exposure cost is high. Three strategies have obvious phased advantages with regard to temptation to defect when pay moderate attention to payoff. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Chaos, solitons and fractals. Volume 160(2022)
- Journal:
- Chaos, solitons and fractals
- Issue:
- Volume 160(2022)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 160, Issue 2022 (2022)
- Year:
- 2022
- Volume:
- 160
- Issue:
- 2022
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2022-0160-2022-0000
- Page Start:
- Page End:
- Publication Date:
- 2022-07
- Subjects:
- Exposure-based reputation -- Evolution of cooperation -- Prisoner's dilemma
Chaotic behavior in systems -- Periodicals
Solitons -- Periodicals
Fractals -- Periodicals
Chaotic behavior in systems
Fractals
Solitons
Periodicals
003.7 - Journal URLs:
- http://www.elsevier.com/journals ↗
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09600779 ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112205 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0960-0779
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 3129.716000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 22327.xml