Critical thresholds of benefit distribution in an extended snowdrift game model. (April 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Li, Bin-Quan; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Guan, Jian-Yue
• Is Part Of: Chaos, solitons and fractals. Volume 157(2022)
• Publication Date: 2022-04
• Subjects: Dominant strategy -- Fixation probability -- Snowdrift game -- Dynamics of evolution; Chaotic behavior in systems -- Periodicals; Solitons -- Periodicals; Fractals -- Periodicals; Chaotic behavior in systems; Fractals; Solitons; Periodicals; 003.7
• DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2022.111948
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0960-0779

Abstract

Highlights: We introduce a model to study the evolution of inequality in the framework of snowdrift game. Inequality is generally stronger in social communities with fewer average interactions among the individuals, and weaker in the case of dense interactions. Introducing incentives and punishments makes it harder for cooperators to get a fair share of the profits. The simulation results confirm such theoretical analysis, in both the infinite unstructured populations and the finite structured populations. Abstract: Social inequality takes many forms, but its most basic form is that individuals give the least and get the most in return. In this paper, we introduce an extended model based on the snowdrift game model, involving the concept of inequality (unequal distribution of benefit). We calculated the critical threshold for the benefits distribution under the dominant cooperative strategy through numerical simulation and theoretical analysis. We illustrate the similarities and differences in the evolution of cooperation with and without incentives and punishments. Both theoretical and simulation results show that within the limited resource range, the larger the resource is, the larger the critical proportion of benefits that defectors can exploit, whether in unstructured or structured population. We also show that the inequality is stronger in social structures with sparse connections and weaker in those with dense connections. Moreover, we revealed that introducing incentives and punishments makes it harder for cooperators to get a fair share of the profits.