An investigation of policy incentives for delaying public pension benefit claims. (17th April 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kitamura, Tomoki; Nakashima, Kunio
• Is Part Of: Review of behavioral finance. Volume 13:Number 2(2021)
• Page Start: 109
• Page End: 124
• Publication Date: 2020-04-17
• Subjects: Public pension -- Benefits claim deferment -- Policy incentives -- Household behavior -- D14 -- H31 -- H55; Investments -- Psychological aspects -- Periodicals; Investments -- Decision making -- Periodicals; 332.605
• DOI: 10.1108/RBF-09-2019-0117
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1940-5979

Abstract

Abstract : Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the potential and cost of policy incentives for individuals to defer public pension (social security) claims. Design/methodology/approach: Using Internet survey experiments, the impacts of introducing three potential policies to defer public pension claims are examined: (1) a tax incentive for private term pension premiums, (2) a tax incentive for private term pension benefits and (3) a tax disincentive for financial asset holdings. Effectiveness of information provision regarding projection of future financial assets is also examined. Findings: Tax incentives have a certain impact on deferment of public pension claims. Among incentives, increase of benefits is the most effective one. Providing information regarding future financial assets reduces incentives. Originality/value: This study is original in measuring cost for delaying public pension claims according to incentives and information provision.