Why worker-supported collective bargaining may still fail: Union strategies and supply chain structure in South China. Issue 2 (31st December 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Luo, Siqi; Yang, Tao
• Is Part Of: Employee relations. Volume 42:Issue 2(2020)
• Page Start: 471
• Page End: 491
• Publication Date: 2019-12-31
• Subjects: Supply chain -- Collective bargaining -- Enterprise union -- Industrial structure -- Production regime; Industrial relations -- Periodicals; 331.05
• DOI: 10.1108/ER-06-2019-0250
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0142-5455

Abstract

Abstract : Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that some enterprise unions in South China, as strategic labor actors, made local progress in collective bargaining, but further elaborates on why gainful bargaining would require a more systematic understanding of the prevailing industrial structure. Design/methodology/approach: This paper is mainly drawn from intensive site visits and 51 in-depth interviews in 2013 and 2014, and several follow-ups up to 2018. Three cases of collective bargaining, featuring different union strategies of assertive negotiation, informal cooperation and direct confrontation, are discussed in detail. Findings: The study illustrates that viable collective bargaining with worker-supported unions is possible in China. However, the effectiveness of bargaining does not count on this alone; the supply chain structure also imposes significant constraints, mainly by narrowing the bargaining scope of each supplier and differentiating the structural power of their unions. In these cases, institutionalized union coordination beyond individual suppliers is proposed. Research limitations/implications: These cases began as post-strike bargaining in Japanese auto supply chains and became the frontier of industrial relations in China. The impact of the supply chain in different sectors or regions requires further study. Originality/value: This paper draws attention to the effect of an "invisible" but increasingly significant factor, industrial structure, on enterprise-level collective bargaining in China, unlike many previous criticisms of unwillingness or incompetence among labor actors.