I, VOLKSWAGEN. Issue 2 (22nd June 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Collins, Stephanie
• Is Part Of: Philosophical quarterly. Volume 72:Issue 2(2022)
• Page Start: 283
• Page End: 304
• Publication Date: 2021-06-22
• Subjects: collective agency -- collective responsibility -- blameworthiness -- self-awareness -- social ontology -- organisations; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqab032
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8094

Abstract

Abstract: Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don't hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don't hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call 'moral self-awareness'. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives seem to lack the capacity for moral self-awareness. I solve the problem by giving an account of how collectives have this capacity. The trick is to take seriously individuals' status as flesh-and-blood material constituents of collectives. The idea will be: under certain conditions that I specify, an individual can be the locus of a collective's moral self-awareness. The account provides general insights concerning collectives' dependence on members, the boundaries of membership, and the locus of collectives' phenomenology.