The influence of donation behavior on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma. (July 2022) - Zhang, Lulu
Abstract: This article assumes that in the repeated space prisoner's dilemma game, the payoff of each individual in each round consists of game payoff and donation payoff. If individual's game payoff is higher than the donation standard, the payoff that exceeds the donation standard will be donated to the neighbors whose payoff is lower than their own. Through numeric simulation, we conclude that the donation behavior can effectively promote the evolution of cooperation. With the increase of the donation ratio, cooperation appears, and when it reaches a certain value, cooperation is dominant. At this time, increasing the donation intensity will not contribute to the cooperation. Moreover, with every additional increment of the donation ratio, the donation standard also has an impact on the cooperation. The lower the donation standard is, the easier it is to promote the evolution of cooperation. For different parameters, there will be three states: all cooperators, coexistence of cooperators and defectors, and all defectors. In addition, with the increase of donation ratio, the greater the average payoff of all individuals, and the smaller the payoff variance.