Do firms with foreign residency rights controlling shareholders reduce R&D investment?. (25th November 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Qiu, Baoyin; Cheng, Bo; Qiu, Hangeng; Chan, Kam C.
• Is Part Of: Managerial and decision economics. Volume 43:Number 5(2022)
• Page Start: 1403
• Page End: 1422
• Publication Date: 2021-11-25
• Subjects: Managerial economics -- Periodicals; Decision making -- Periodicals; Management -- Periodicals; 658.15
• DOI: 10.1002/mde.3462
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0143-6570

Abstract

Abstract : We investigate the impact of the foreign residency rights of controlling shareholders (foreign residency rights, or FRRs) on their firms' research and development (R&D) investment. The results are robust using a propensity score matching model and alternative metrics of FRRs and R&D investment. The findings suggest that firms with FRR controlling shareholders engage in less R&D investment than those without FRR controlling shareholders. Additional analysis indicates that high institutional investor ownership and a high‐quality internal control can restrain the adverse impact of FRRs on a firm's R&D investment.