How is working memory content consciously experienced? The 'conscious copy' model of WM introspection. (August 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Jacobs, Christianne; Silvanto, Juha
• Is Part Of: Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews. Volume 55(2015:Aug.)
• Page Start: 510
• Page End: 519
• Publication Date: 2015-08
• Subjects: Working memory -- Introspection -- Consciousness -- Visual short-term memory -- Mental imagery; Psychophysiology -- Periodicals; Human behavior -- Periodicals; Animal behavior -- Periodicals; Neurology -- Periodicals; Behavior -- Periodicals; Ethology -- Periodicals; Neurology -- Periodicals; Psychophysiologie -- Périodiques; Comportement humain -- Périodiques; Animaux -- Mœurs et comportement -- Périodiques; Neurologie -- Périodiques; Animal behavior; Human behavior; Neurology; Psychophysiology; Periodicals; Electronic journals; 573.8
• DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.06.003
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0149-7634

Abstract

Highlights: We propose a new model on the conscious experience of working memory (WM) content. We suggest that WM introspection does not operate on the actual memory trace. Instead, a new representation is created for the conscious domain. The functional roles of WM and consciousness require distinct representations. Abstract: We address the issue of how visual information stored in working memory (WM) is introspected. In other words, how do we become aware of WM content in order to consciously examine or manipulate it? Influential models of WM have suggested that WM representations are either conscious by definition, or directly accessible for conscious inspection. We propose that WM introspection does not operate on the actual memory trace but rather requires a new representation to be created for the conscious domain. This conscious representation exists in addition and in parallel to the actual memory representation. The existence of such a separate representation is revealed by and reflected in the qualitatively different functional characteristics between the actual memory trace and its conscious experience, and their distinct interactions within external visual input. Our model differs from state-based models in that WM introspection does not involve a change in the state of WM content, but rather involves the creation of a new, second representation existing in parallel to the original memory trace.