Democracy and Epistemic Fairness: Testimonial Justice as a Founding Principle of Aggregative Democracy. Issue 2 (30th September 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kim, Junyeol
• Is Part Of: Southern journal of philosophy. Volume 60:Issue 2(2022)
• Page Start: 173
• Page End: 193
• Publication Date: 2021-09-30
• Subjects: 105
• DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12440
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0038-4283

Abstract

Abstract: The current discussion on the relationship of epistemic justice to democracy focuses on its relationship to deliberative democracy. This article concerns the relationship of epistemic justice—specifically, testimonial justice which I call "epistemic fairness"—to aggregative democracy or democracy by voting. The aim of this article is to establish that in a good theory of democracy, epistemic fairness is one of the founding principles of the democratic institution of voting, that is, the principles by which the democratic institution of voting is organized. Under an arguably plausible interpretation, the democratic institution of voting turns out to be committed to realizing epistemic fairness. If a theory of democracy implies that epistemic fairness is a founding principle of the democratic institution of voting, a number of implications follow with respect to the issues related to the practice of voting in actual democracies, such as the problem of gerrymandering or the fairness of the aggregation rule.