Evidence Through a Glass, Darkly. Issue 1 (2nd January 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Fritts, Megan
• Is Part Of: Australasian philosophical review. Volume 5:Issue 1(2021)
• Page Start: 56
• Page End: 61
• Publication Date: 2021-01-02
• Subjects: belief -- epistemology -- evidentialism -- faith -- philosophy of religion; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 101
• DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2021.2000191
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2474-0500

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Dormandy's 'True Faith' presents two views on the proper epistemological stance towards faith: doxastic-partialism and evidentialism. Here, I argue for a third option that cuts across the evidentialism/partialism distinction. I first analyze the Pascalian conception of faith, arguing that Pascal begins with the cognitive attitude of acceptance rather than belief. Next, I discuss Dormandy's case for evidentialism, and contend that some evidence—the kind gained through transformative experiences—presents a difficulty for her argument. Finally, I offer my proposed view—Partialist Evidentialism—and argue that this approach is necessary for acquiring some unique kinds of evidence for religious faith.