The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops. (27th August 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Friehe, Tim; Mungan, Murat C.
• Is Part Of: Journal of public economic theory. Volume 23:Number 1(2021)
• Page Start: 141
• Page End: 157
• Publication Date: 2020-08-27
• Subjects: Economic policy -- Periodicals; Finance, Public -- Periodicals; 338.9005
• DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12472
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1097-3923

Abstract

Abstract: This article questions whether excessive policing practices can persist in an environment where law enforcement policies are subject to political pressures. Specifically, it considers a setting where the police decide whether to conduct stops based on the suspiciousness of a person's behavior and the potential liability for conducting a wrongful stop. We establish that the liability level that results in a voting equilibrium is smaller than optimal, and consequently, that excessive policing practices emerge in equilibrium.