Advocacy coalitions and political control. Issue 2 (23rd February 2022)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Advocacy coalitions and political control. Issue 2 (23rd February 2022)
- Main Title:
- Advocacy coalitions and political control
- Authors:
- Nowlin, Matthew C.
Trochmann, Maren
Rabovsky, Thomas M. - Abstract:
- Abstract: The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) posits that policy actors, including elected officials and bureaucrats, aggregate into coalitions based on shared beliefs and coordinate to achieve policy objectives. Yet, bureaucrats are often subject to political control mechanisms understood within a principal‐agent framework. Combining insights from principal‐agent theory and the ACF, we explore the nature of principal‐agent relationships within and across advocacy coalitions in the United States using case studies of nuclear waste management and fair housing policy. Specifically, we develop three propositions regarding principals and agents as members of advocacy coalitions and examine those propositions by comparing the two case studies. We find that powerful elected officials and expert bureaucrats are important resources for coalitions; bureaucrats are in coalitions but face cross‐pressure from principals in opposing coalitions; and control mechanisms embedded in policy designs by principals can limit bureaucratic discretion in a way that aligns with coalition goals. Related Articles: Neill, Katharine A., and John C. Morris. 2012. "A Tangled Web of Principals and Agents: Examining the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill through a Principal–Agent Lens." Politics & Policy 40(4): 629–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00371.x Peterson, Holly L., Mark K. McBeth, and Michael D. Jones. 2020. "Policy Process Theory for Rural Studies: Navigating Context and Generalization inAbstract: The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) posits that policy actors, including elected officials and bureaucrats, aggregate into coalitions based on shared beliefs and coordinate to achieve policy objectives. Yet, bureaucrats are often subject to political control mechanisms understood within a principal‐agent framework. Combining insights from principal‐agent theory and the ACF, we explore the nature of principal‐agent relationships within and across advocacy coalitions in the United States using case studies of nuclear waste management and fair housing policy. Specifically, we develop three propositions regarding principals and agents as members of advocacy coalitions and examine those propositions by comparing the two case studies. We find that powerful elected officials and expert bureaucrats are important resources for coalitions; bureaucrats are in coalitions but face cross‐pressure from principals in opposing coalitions; and control mechanisms embedded in policy designs by principals can limit bureaucratic discretion in a way that aligns with coalition goals. Related Articles: Neill, Katharine A., and John C. Morris. 2012. "A Tangled Web of Principals and Agents: Examining the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill through a Principal–Agent Lens." Politics & Policy 40(4): 629–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00371.x Peterson, Holly L., Mark K. McBeth, and Michael D. Jones. 2020. "Policy Process Theory for Rural Studies: Navigating Context and Generalization in Rural Policy." Politics & Policy 48(4): 576–617. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12366 Swigger, Alexandra, and Bruce Timothy Heinmiller. 2014. "Advocacy Coalitions and Mental Health Policy: The Adoption of Community Treatment Orders in Ontario." Politics & Policy 42(2): 246–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12066 … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Politics & policy. Volume 50:Issue 2(2022)
- Journal:
- Politics & policy
- Issue:
- Volume 50:Issue 2(2022)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 50, Issue 2 (2022)
- Year:
- 2022
- Volume:
- 50
- Issue:
- 2
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2022-0050-0002-0000
- Page Start:
- 201
- Page End:
- 224
- Publication Date:
- 2022-02-23
- Subjects:
- ACF -- Advocacy Coalition Framework -- fair housing policy -- nuclear waste management -- policy design -- policy theory -- political control -- principal‐agent theory -- United States
Political science -- Periodicals
World politics -- 21st century -- Periodicals
320 - Journal URLs:
- http://firstsearch.oclc.org ↗
http://firstsearch.oclc.org/journal=1555-5623;screen=info;ECOIP ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1747-1346 ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/loi/polp ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1111/polp.12458 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 1555-5623
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 6543.942500
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 21348.xml