The incentive mechanism and decision-making behavior in the green building supply market: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis. (15th April 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Liu, Yu; Zuo, Jian; Pan, Min; Ge, Qi; Chang, Ruidong; Feng, Xiong; Fu, Yanting; Dong, Na
• Is Part Of: Building and environment. Volume 214(2022)
• Publication Date: 2022-04-15
• Subjects: Green building -- Supply market -- Incentive mechanism -- Decision-making behavior -- Tripartite evolutionary game; Buildings -- Environmental engineering -- Periodicals; Building -- Research -- Periodicals; Constructions -- Technique de l'environnement -- Périodiques; Electronic journals; 696
• DOI: 10.1016/j.buildenv.2022.108903
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0360-1323

Abstract

Abstract: Exploring the incentive mechanism and the decision-making behavior of stakeholders in green building supply market is conducive to promote its sustainable development. In practice, stakeholders in supply market will constantly adjust their strategies due to environmental changes, which make the entire interaction process complex. In order to investigate the dynamic evolution of the stakeholders' decision-making behavior, the study innovatively introduced public supervision and penalty mechanisms to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, supplier and developer. Then, the equilibrium and stability strategies of each game player were analyzed and the influence of initial strategy selection and different parameter changes on the players' decision-making was explored by simulation. The findings are as follow: (1) The decisions of supplier and developer have a significant mutual influence while the government's decision-making behavior is almost unaffected by either of them; (2) Excessive subsidies and penalty will prompt some game players to choose non-green behaviors so that appropriate subsidies and fines should be determined dynamically based on the game model; (3) High cost is the critical barrier to the supplier and developer entering green building market and the developer is more cost-sensitive than the supplier; (4) Interestingly, negative public supervision may lead to government's weak supervision, which should be paid attention to by the government. Finally, targeted countermeasures were put forward for green building development. The research results can be used as a reference for the government to improve incentive measures and decision support for stakeholders to adjust their strategies. Highlights: A tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, supplier, and developer was established innovatively. The penalty mechanism was introduced to explore its inhibitory effect on free-riding behavior of the supplier. Public supervision was innovatively introduced to discover its influence on government's decision-making behavior. The mutual influence and evolution process of stakeholders' decision-making were revealed.