For love or money? Family versus financial blockholders in international acquisitions. (24th June 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Chen, Victor Zitian; Hobdari, Bersant; Kellermanns, Franz W.; Sluhan, Anne
• Is Part Of: Corporate governance. Volume 30:Number 2(2022)
• Page Start: 140
• Page End: 160
• Publication Date: 2021-06-24
• Subjects: corporate governance -- family firms -- financial blockholders -- international acquisitions -- pressure‐resistant -- pressure‐sensitive, socioemotional wealth; Corporate governance -- Periodicals; 658.1145
• DOI: 10.1111/corg.12392
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0964-8410

Abstract

Abstract: Research Question/Issue: We study the relationship between family blockholding of voting rights and the relative size of international acquisitions, and the moderating effect of two types of financial blockholders (pressure‐resistant and pressure‐sensitive blockholders). Research Findings/Insights: Employing an international sample of 8, 687 non‐financial cross‐border acquisitions conducted by 4, 630 acquirer firms from 40 home markets to 66 host countries between 2004 and 2013, we find a U‐shaped relationship between family blockholding of voting rights and the relative size of international acquisitions. Further, we find evidence that this relationship is moderated by the presence and type of financial blockholders. While pressure‐resistant financial blockholders shift this relationship downwards (due to intensified conflicts), pressure‐sensitive financial blockholders shift it upwards. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to the literature on family firm governance and internationalization on several fronts. First, we revisit the predominant logic of linear effects of the family blockholding. We suggest the family blockholding's effects are related to nonlinear risk preferences of family owners, expressed through socioemotional wealth (SEW) slack. Second, we suggest that the "dominant shareholder interest" assumption of family firms, usually based on the controlling family's SEW should be interpreted contingent upon the interests of other financial shareholders. Finally, using family‐financial blockholder conflicts as the scenario, we suggest that principal‐principal conflicts depend on the composition of the conflicting blockholders, specifically, upon the nature of their relations with the firm. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to policymakers and those interested in incentivizing family ownership that family owners' risk behaviors should be understood and discussed in the context of different financial blockholders as a reference group.