Informal Coalitions and Legislative Agenda Setting in Mexico's Multiparty Presidential System. (February 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kerevel, Yann P.; Bárcena Juárez, Sergio A.
• Is Part Of: Latin American politics and society. Volume 64:Number 1(2022)
• Page Start: 1
• Page End: 22
• Publication Date: 2022-02
• Subjects: Agenda setting -- legislative coalitions -- roll rates -- legislative organization -- cartel theory -- committees; Latin America -- Periodicals; Amérique latine -- Périodiques; Sociale ontwikkeling; Politieke ontwikkeling; 980
• DOI: 10.1017/lap.2021.51
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1531-426X

Abstract

ABSTRACT: To what extent can presidents exert gatekeeping power in opposition-led legislatures? Drawing on a study of roll rates in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, where presidents lack legislative majorities and often face a legislature controlled by the opposition, this article argues that gatekeeping power is divided among multiple actors. It finds that presidents exert weak gatekeeping power over the agenda. While presidents and their parties are rarely defeated in votes related to presidential initiatives, they generally create stable, informal coalitions with opposition parties to pass their bills. Moreover, the agenda-setting power of the president and the president's party is weaker with bills that originate in the legislative branch, where the party is occasionally rolled on legislative initiatives and during the amendment stage if it is not also the median party.