Christine Ladd-Franklin on the nature and unity of the proposition. Issue 2 (4th March 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Boyd, Kenneth
• Is Part Of: British journal for the history of philosophy. Volume 30:Issue 2(2022)
• Page Start: 231
• Page End: 249
• Publication Date: 2022-03-04
• Subjects: Proposition -- Christine Ladd-Franklin -- pragmatism -- Peirce; Philosophy -- History -- Periodicals; 109
• DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2021.1931026
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0960-8788

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Although in recent years Christine Ladd-Franklin has received recognition for her contributions to logic and psychology, her role in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy, as well as her relationship with American pragmatism, has yet to be fully appreciated. My goal here is to attempt to better understand Ladd-Franklin's place in the pragmatist tradition by drawing attention to her work on the nature and unity of the proposition. The question concerning the unity of the proposition – namely, the problem of how to determine what differentiates a mere collection of terms from a unified and meaningful proposition – received substantial attention in Ladd-Franklin's time, and would continue to interest analytic philosophers well into the twentieth century. I argue that Ladd-Franklin had a distinct theory of the proposition and solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition that she developed over the course of her writings on logic and philosophy. In spelling out her views, I will also show her work interacted with and influenced that of the pragmatist who was her greatest influence, C.S. Peirce.