How Do States Renegotiate International Institutions? Japan's Renegotiation Diplomacy Since World War II. (17th November 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Lipscy, Phillip Y.
• Other Names: Kruck Andreas guestEditor.; Zangl Bernhard guestEditor.
• Is Part Of: Global policy. Volume 11(2020)Supplement 3
• Page Start: 17
• Page End: 27
• Publication Date: 2020-11-17
• Subjects: Globalization -- Periodicals; International relations -- Periodicals; World politics -- Periodicals; 327.1705
• DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12833
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1758-5880

Abstract

Abstract: How do states renegotiate their status in international organizations? I evaluate two hypotheses about renegotiation strategy choice. The first hypothesis conceptualizes renegotiation strategies as intertwined with challenger state objectives: reformist states will opt for integrative strategies – principled persuasion or strategic cooptation – while revisionist states will pursue distributive strategies – power bargaining or rhetorical coercion. The second hypothesis assumes states choose renegotiation strategies instrumentally, combining integrative and distributive strategies to maximize the likelihood of a successful alteration of the status quo. I evaluate the hypotheses by examining Japan, a country that has pursued renegotiation diplomacy across many institutional contexts. The case study evidence broadly favors the instrumental hypothesis: despite reformist objectives, Japan has often used power bargaining in tandem with integrative strategies. Contrary to the first hypothesis, Japanese objectives have not been clearly intertwined with renegotiation strategy choice. I further argue that future research should examine domestic political determinants of strategy choice, which have been important in the evolution of Japanese renegotiation diplomacy. Abstract : These observations suggest that greater theorizing is needed around the domestic politics of renegotiation strategy choice.