Position-taking in the Euro crisis. Issue 4 (3rd April 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Armingeon, Klaus; Cranmer, Skyler
• Is Part Of: Journal of European public policy. Volume 25:Issue 4(2018)
• Page Start: 546
• Page End: 566
• Publication Date: 2018-04-03
• Subjects: Austerity -- coalitions -- European fiscal crisis -- European Council -- Fiscal Compact; European Union countries -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; Political planning -- European Union countries -- Periodicals; Politique publique -- Pays de l'Union européenne -- Périodiques; Pays de l'Union européenne -- Politique et gouvernement -- Périodiques; 361.61094
• DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1268642
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1350-1763

Abstract

ABSTRACT: The decisions faced by members of the European Union (EU) during the sovereign debt crisis focused on fiscal policies in the Eurozone and structural reforms in the countries that experienced fiscal problems. Who sided with whom in these decision processes and why? We posit that states in strong economic positions will minimize the expense of supporting weaker economies because those economically strong states do not see austerity measures for themselves in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, less competitive states seek to avoid austerity measures because, even if an austerity outcome that imposes heavy costs on their state is inevitable, vocal opposition to the measures will minimize the electoral costs incurred by the government. States that are neither competitive nor uncompetitive should avoid taking an open position and simply support a majority coalition. Empirically, we show that the competiveness of a given state's national economy is the major explanatory factor for the position it ultimately takes.