An Epistemic Objection to Racial Profiling. (2nd November 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Lloyd, Alexandra
• Is Part Of: Social epistemology. Volume 35:Number 6(2021)
• Page Start: 636
• Page End: 644
• Publication Date: 2021-11-02
• Subjects: Racial profiling -- epistemology -- statistical evidence -- outright belief -- social epistemology; Social epistemology -- Periodicals; 121
• DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2021.1943560
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0269-1728

Abstract

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I identify an important epistemic problem with the practice of racial profiling. Racial profiling relies on naked statistical evidence to justify reasonable suspicion. Naked statistical evidence refers to probabilities that are not created by a particular case, but that existed prior to or independently of the case under consideration (Wells, 1992). I argue that naked statistical evidence cannot justify outright belief in someone's worthiness of suspicion, it can only justify a high credence. This is because statistical evidence fails to be causally connected to the particular case under consideration. According to our blame norms, a precondition for apt blame is that an agent has an outright belief that the agent is responsible for the act for which they are blamed; high credence cannot play this role. I argue that reasonable suspicion in the context of racial profiling frequently involves blame such that it demands the same strict evidential standards. Therefore, we can identify an important epistemic objection to this practice.