UNIQUE MARKOV EQUILIBRIUM UNDER LIMITED COMMITMENT. (31st March 2020)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- UNIQUE MARKOV EQUILIBRIUM UNDER LIMITED COMMITMENT. (31st March 2020)
- Main Title:
- UNIQUE MARKOV EQUILIBRIUM UNDER LIMITED COMMITMENT
- Authors:
- Bloise, Gaetano
- Abstract:
- Abstract: I develop a recursive method for the characterization of competitive equilibrium under limited commitment with not‐too‐tight solvency constraints. The reputational mechanism is fragile, as it sustains constrained efficiency as well as a large set of constrained inefficient equilibria. However, I establish that the only strongly ergodic Markov equilibrium with trade is constrained efficient. The method relies on a planning program along with the theory of monotone concave operators. It is suitable for other applications to macroeconomics and dynamic contracts.
- Is Part Of:
- International economic review. Volume 61:Number 2(2020)
- Journal:
- International economic review
- Issue:
- Volume 61:Number 2(2020)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 61, Issue 2 (2020)
- Year:
- 2020
- Volume:
- 61
- Issue:
- 2
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2020-0061-0002-0000
- Page Start:
- 721
- Page End:
- 751
- Publication Date:
- 2020-03-31
- Subjects:
- Economics -- Periodicals
330.05 - Journal URLs:
- http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗
- DOI:
- 10.1111/iere.12438 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0020-6598
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 4539.791000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 20459.xml