A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism. (7th October 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kohl, Markus
• Is Part Of: European journal of philosophy. Volume 29:Number 4(2021)
• Page Start: 827
• Page End: 845
• Publication Date: 2020-10-07
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, European -- Periodicals; Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century -- Periodicals; 190
• DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12607
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0966-8373

Abstract

Abstract: I examine how Kant argues for the transcendental ideality of space. I defend a reading on which Kant accepts the ideality of space because it explains our (actual) knowledge that mathematical judgments are necessarily true. I argue that this reading is preferable over the alternative suggestion that Kant can infer the ideality of space directly from the fact that we have an a priori intuition of space. Moreover, I argue that the reading I propose does not commit Kant to incoherent modal views. If we carefully distinguish between different senses of modality, the fact that our spatial form of intuition is (in some sense) contingent does not undermine the claim that this form can explain how our mathematical judgments are (in some sense) necessary.