Anger and its desires. (17th February 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Silva, Laura
• Is Part Of: European journal of philosophy. Volume 29:Number 4(2021)
• Page Start: 1115
• Page End: 1135
• Publication Date: 2021-02-17
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, European -- Periodicals; Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century -- Periodicals; 190
• DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12628
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0966-8373

Abstract

Abstract: The orthodox view of anger takes desires for revenge or retribution to be central to the emotion. In this paper, I develop an empirically informed challenge to the retributive view of anger. In so doing, I argue that a distinct desire is central to anger: a desire for recognition. Desires for recognition aim at the targets of anger acknowledging the wrong they have committed, as opposed to aiming for their suffering. In light of the centrality of this desire for recognition, I argue that the retributive view of anger should be abandoned. I consider and dismiss two types of moves that can be made on the part of a proponent of the orthodox view in response to my argument. I propose that a pluralist view, which allows for both retribution and recognition in anger, is to be preferred.