A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism. (14th October 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Alter, Torin
• Is Part Of: Thought. Volume 10:Number 4(2021)
• Page Start: 264
• Page End: 274
• Publication Date: 2021-10-14
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Logic -- Periodicals; Knowledge, Theory of -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1002/tht3.504
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2161-2234

Abstract

Abstract: The supervenience requirement on physicalism says roughly that if physicalism is true then mental properties supervene on fundamental physical properties. After explaining the basis of the requirement, I defend it against objections presented by Lei Zhong ("Physicalism without supervenience, " Philosophical Studies 178 (5), 2021: 1529–44), Barbara Gail Montero ("Must physicalism imply supervenience of the mental on the physical?" Journal of Philosophy 110, 2013: 93–110), and Montero and Christopher Devlin Brown ("Making room for a this‐worldly physicalism, " Topoi 37 (3), 2018: 523–32).