An auction mechanism for platoon leader determination in single-brand cooperative vehicle platooning. (December 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Sun, Xiaotong; Yin, Yafeng
• Is Part Of: Economics of transportation. Volume 28(2021)
• Publication Date: 2021-12
• Subjects: Vehicle platooning -- Energy savings -- Driving-effort reduction -- Auction -- Truthful ε- approximate mechanism; Transportation -- Periodicals; 388.049
• DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100233
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2212-0122

Abstract

Abstract: Cooperative vehicle platooning enabled by connected automated vehicle (CAV) technology has been identified to bring energy savings and driving-effort reduction. However, the intrinsic difference of gained benefits between the leading vehicle and the following vehicles hampers the spontaneous platooning via peer-to-peer coordination. This study proposes an auction mechanism that determines the leader–follower positioning together with the associated benefits, for facilitating the formation and maintaining the behavioral stability of vehicle platoons in a distributed way. We theoretically prove that there is no mechanism to achieve an efficient outcome in an ex post equilibrium, requiring individual rationality and budget balance. In this regard, we provide a truthful ε -approximate auction mechanism that deploys a linear transfer function, which guarantees that the implemented outcome is an efficient approximate dominant strategy equilibrium. Highlights: The leading vehicle in a platoon takes the most driving effort and receives the least fuel savings. Behavioral unstable platoons arise as no rational individual would voluntarily be a leader. An auction mechanism is used to determine leader and followers and ensure behavioral stability. The auction mechanism leads to a truthful ε - approximate equilibrium. The equilibrium is ex post economically efficient, budget balanced, and individual rational.