Rationality and Responsibility. Issue 4 (1st October 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Schmidt, Sebastian
• Is Part Of: Australasian philosophical review. Volume 4:Issue 4(2020)
• Page Start: 379
• Page End: 385
• Publication Date: 2020-10-01
• Subjects: rationality -- reasons -- responsibility -- reasons-responsiveness -- internalism -- externalism; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 101
• DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2021.1964245
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2474-0500

Abstract

ABSTRACT : Broome takes the debate on rationality to be concerned with the ordinary use of 'rational'. I argue that this is at best misleading. For the object of current theories of rationality is determined by a specific use of 'rational' that is intimately connected to blame and praise. I call the property this use refers to 'rationalityRESP '. This focus on rationalityRESP, I argue, has two significant implications for Broome's critique of theories of rationality as reasons-responsiveness. First, rationalityRESP is plausibly conceived of as a kind of reasons-responsiveness. Secondly, Broome's dispute with internalists about normativity as well as his dispute with externalists about rationality both hinge on questions regarding the concept of responsibility. I conclude that philosophers should integrate discussions about responsibility in their debates about rationality.