A Defence of Lichtenberg. (14th December 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Merlo, Giovanni
• Is Part Of: Episteme. Volume 18:Number 4(2021)
• Page Start: 624
• Page End: 639
• Publication Date: 2021-12-14
• Subjects: cogito -- Lichtenberg -- self -- collective thinking; Social epistemology -- Periodicals; 121
• DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.40
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1742-3600

Abstract

Abstract: Cartesians and Lichtenbergians have diverging views of the deliverances of introspection. According to the Cartesians, a rational subject, competent with the relevant concepts, can come to know that he or she thinks – hence, that he or she exists – on the sole basis of his or her introspective awareness of his or her conscious thinking. According to the Lichtenbergians, this is not possible. This paper offers a defence of the Lichtenbergian position using Peacocke and Campbell's recent exchange on Descartes's cogito as a framework for discussion. A thought-experiment will be presented involving two communities with radically different conceptions of the metaphysics of the self. The purpose of the thought-experiment is to suggest that a substantive metaphysical thesis, whose truth cannot be a priori known, is presupposed by any justified transition from one's introspective awareness of a certain mental activity to the self-ascription of that activity.