Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies. Issue Volume 28:Issue e2(2019) (18th January 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Crosbie, Eric; Bialous, Stella; Glantz, Stanton A
• Is Part Of: Tobacco control. Volume 28:Issue e2(2019)
• Page Start: e110
• Page End: e118
• Publication Date: 2019-01-18
• Subjects: Globalisation -- Illegal Tobacco Products -- Public Policy -- Tobacco Industry -- Tobacco Industry Documents; Tobacco use -- Prevention -- Periodicals; Tobacco use -- Periodicals; Smoking -- Law and legislation -- Periodicals; Smoking -- prevention & control -- Periodicals; Tobacco Use Disorder -- prevention & control -- Periodicals; Tobacco -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; 613.85
• DOI: 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054668
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0964-4563

Abstract

Abstract : Objective: Analyse the transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol). Methods: Review of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods. Results: Facing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments' law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs' claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade. Conclusion: Governments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.