Hempel on scientific understanding. (August 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hu, Xingming
• Is Part Of: Studies in history and philosophy of science. Volume 88(2021)
• Page Start: 164
• Page End: 171
• Publication Date: 2021-08
• Subjects: Understanding -- Explanation -- D-N model -- Hempel; Science -- History -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 509
• DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.05.009
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0039-3681

Abstract

Abstract: Hempel seems to hold the following three views: (H1) Understanding is pragmatic/relativistic: Whether one understands why X happened in terms of Explanation E depends on one's beliefs and cognitive abilities; (H2) Whether a scientific explanation is good, just like whether a mathematical proof is good, is a nonpragmatic and objective issue independent of the beliefs or cognitive abilities of individuals; (H3) The goal of scientific explanation is understanding: A good scientific explanation is the one that provides understanding. Apparently, H1, H2, and H3 cannot be all true. Some philosophers think that Hempel is inconsistent, while some others claim that Hempel does not actually hold H3. I argue that Hempel does hold H3 and that he can consistently hold all of H1, H2, and H3 if he endorses what I call the "understanding argument." I also show how attributing the understanding argument to Hempel can make more sense of his D-N model and his philosophical analysis of the pragmatic aspects of scientific explanation.