Why change your beliefs rather than your desires? Two puzzles. (24th April 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Vassend, Olav Benjamin
• Is Part Of: Analysis. Volume 81:Number 2(2021)
• Page Start: 275
• Page End: 281
• Publication Date: 2021-04-24
• Subjects: Decision theory -- epistemology -- conditionalization -- direction of fit -- belief -- desire; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaa064
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0003-2638

Abstract

Abstract: In standard decision theory, the probability function ought to be updated in light of evidence, but the utility function generally stays fixed. However, there is nothing in the formal theory that prevents one from instead updating the utility function, while keeping the probability function fixed. Moreover, there are good arguments for updating the utilities and not just the probabilities. Hence, the first puzzle is whether there is anything that justifies updating beliefs, but not desires, in light of evidence. The paper argues that there is not, but that this raises a second puzzle .