Are sensory experiences contingently representational? A critical notice of David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience. (15th September 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Gow, Laura
• Is Part Of: Mind & language. Volume 36:Number 4(2021)
• Page Start: 627
• Page End: 635
• Publication Date: 2021-09-15
• Subjects: contingent representation -- perception -- qualitative view -- representationalism -- sensory experience; Psycholinguistics -- Periodicals; Thought and thinking -- Periodicals; Language and languages -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 153.42
• DOI: 10.1111/mila.12376
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0268-1064

Abstract

Abstract : David Papineau develops a new argument against representationalism, centering on the idea that sensory experiences are essentially representational on this view. He defends his own "qualitative view" according to which sensory experiences are only contingently representational. I discuss his main argument against essentialist representationalism and then provide two challenges for his positive account. First, Papineau's theory faces a dilemma when it comes to explaining the contents of our perceptual beliefs in situations where the conscious character of sensory experience comes apart from what it represents. Second, we may need to abandon the idea that sensory experiences are assessable for veridicality.