Denying Descartes and wary of Wittgenstein: Response to Franz. (February 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Michell, Joel
• Is Part Of: Theory & psychology. Volume 32:Number 1(2022)
• Page Start: 151
• Page End: 157
• Publication Date: 2022-02
• Subjects: Cartesian dualism -- conceptual analysis -- measurement -- mental concepts -- psychometrics; Psychology -- Periodicals; 150.1
• DOI: 10.1177/09593543211046204
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0959-3543

Abstract

In his article, "'Are Psychological Attributes Quantitative?' is not an Empirical Question: Conceptual Confusions in the Measurement Debate, " Franz (2022) concludes that psychological measurement does not rest on empirical hypotheses but rather on linguistic deceptions. His major premise is that psychometrics is inherently Cartesian. History shows otherwise: the mantras of operationism and the rituals of construct validity were intended to exorcise psyche from psychometrics. These mainstays of psychometrics ensured that theoretical constructs were more frequently dispositional concepts than they were mental concepts. It is with the latter, however, especially with attempts to measure currently occurring mental states, such as anxiety, that Franz's argument looks more promising, but nevertheless it fails because it rests upon Wittgenstein's views about the grammar of mental discourse. I conclude that conceptual analysis, realistically construed and applied to mental concepts, may show that they exclude quantitative structure. Despite that, it is always possible that empirical research might elicit quantitative-friendly revisions of mental concepts.