Do supermajority rules really deter extremism? the role of electoral competition1. (January 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kishishita, Daiki; Yamagishi, Atsushi
• Is Part Of: Journal of theoretical politics. Volume 34:Number 1(2022)
• Page Start: 127
• Page End: 144
• Publication Date: 2022-01
• Subjects: Divergence -- Probabilistic voting -- Supermajority -- Legislative bargaining; Political science -- Periodicals; 320
• DOI: 10.1177/09516298211061161
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0951-6298

Abstract

This study investigates how supermajority rules in a legislature affect electoral competition. We construct an extensive-form game wherein parties choose policy platforms in an election. Post election, the policy is determined based on a legislative voting rule. At symmetric equilibrium, supermajority rules induce divergence of policy platforms if and only if the parties are sufficiently attached to their preferred platform. Thus, supermajority rules may not always lead to moderate policies once electoral competition is considered.