Classification revisited: On time, methodology and position in decolonizing anthropology. (March 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pels, Peter
• Is Part Of: Anthropological theory. Volume 22:Number 1(2022)
• Page Start: 78
• Page End: 101
• Publication Date: 2022-03
• Subjects: Classification -- decolonization -- temporality -- methodology; Anthropology -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Anthropology -- Periodicals; Sociology -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Sociology -- Periodicals; 301.01
• DOI: 10.1177/14634996211011749
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1463-4996

Abstract

Renewed calls for decolonizing anthropology in the 21st century raise the question of what work earlier waves of decolonization since the 1960s have left undone. Some of this work should focus on the classification of human differences, which figured prominently in all phases of the discipline's history: as a methodology in its racist phases, as an object of study during its late colonial phase of professionalization, as self-critical reflexivity in the 1980s and 1990s, and as a renewed critique in the 21st century. Can a universal methodology of studying classifications of human kinds arise from the discipline's past of colonial stereotyping? I argue affirmatively, through an approach that recognizes time as the epistemic condition that connects past and present positions to present and future methodologies. Firstly, my analysis distinguishes the parochial embedding in colonial culture of Durkheim and Mauss' ideas about classification from their more universal intentions. This is then developed into a threefold reflexive and timeful methodology of studying classification's nominal-descriptive, constructive, and interventionist dimensions—a process of adding temporality to the study of classification. Subsequently, Anténor Firmin's 19th-century critique of racial classifications, and W. E. B. Du Bois's theory of double consciousness help to show how this threefold methodology addresses the insufficiently theorized process of being classified and discriminated against through racial categories wielded by the powers that be. These arguments radicalize the essay's timeful perspective by concluding that we need to avoid modernist uses of time as classification and adopt the aforementioned threefold methodology in order to put time in classifications of human kinds. This reverses modern positivism's subordination to methodological rules of the epistemic conditions posed by contingent history and shows instead that the universal goals of methodology should be understood as a future ideal.