Dual carving and minimal rationalism. (5th December 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Witmer, D. Gene
• Is Part Of: Analytic philosophy. Volume 62:Number 3(2021)
• Page Start: 223
• Page End: 234
• Publication Date: 2020-12-05
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Analysis (Philosophy) -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/phib.12213
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2153-9596

Abstract

Abstract: In his Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017), Philip Goff defends his anti‐physicalist argument against what he calls the "Dual Carving" objection—the idea that two representations of the very same fact could both be conceptually independent and "transparent, " that is, revealing of the essences of the entities in question. His defense invokes a thesis he calls "Minimal Rationalism." I explore exactly how Minimal Rationalism is supposed to turn aside the objection and argue that the formulation of Minimal Rationalism on offer is ambiguous between stronger and weaker readings. Goff needs the stronger reading to use it in defense of his argument, but only the weaker reading is warranted by the considerations he brings to bear in favor of his rationalism. His "Minimal Rationalism" is, in sum, insufficiently minimal. The upshot is not only that Goff is deprived of a way of turning back an important objection to his case against physicalism; we also gain a better sense of what kind of rationalist thesis is properly invoked in metaphysics.