Forgetting memory skepticism. (15th July 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Frise, Matthew; McCain, Kevin
• Is Part Of: Philosophy and phenomenological research. Volume 103:Number 2(2021)
• Page Start: 253
• Page End: 263
• Publication Date: 2020-07-15
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Phenomenology -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12715
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8205

Abstract

Abstract: Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory's epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is importantly self‐defeating. If it does not threaten memory in this way, then the challenge leaves a foundation for an inference to the best explanation response, one we articulate and support.