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Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions. (24th November 2011)
Record Type:
Journal Article
Title:
Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions. (24th November 2011)
Main Title:
Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions
Abstract : We will constructively prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions. The proof is based on the existence of approximate Nash equilibria which is proved by Sperner's lemma. We follow the Bishop-style constructive mathematics.